Übersetzung/English/Pros and cons
Aus Freiheit statt Angst!
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(→Telecommunications connection data is indispensable in the fight against terrorism and organized crime) |
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* Until the decision to introduce data retention based on a EU Directive in the year 2006, only very few countries worldwide were specifically retaining telecommunications data. In no country were the retention practices as comprehensive as stipulated in the Directive. The wordwide security agencies have so far always been able to go without exhaustive logs of telecommunications data. | * Until the decision to introduce data retention based on a EU Directive in the year 2006, only very few countries worldwide were specifically retaining telecommunications data. In no country were the retention practices as comprehensive as stipulated in the Directive. The wordwide security agencies have so far always been able to go without exhaustive logs of telecommunications data. | ||
| - | In a study, the German Federal Criminal Police Office mentions 381 cases where law-enforcement agencies were missing telecommunications connection data – compared against the more than 6 Million criminal offenses conducted every year this represents a marginal 0.01 | + | In a study, the German Federal Criminal Police Office mentions 381 cases where law-enforcement agencies were missing telecommunications connection data – compared against the more than 6 Million criminal offenses conducted every year this represents a marginal 0.01 percent. Furthermore, these cases were about the resolution of already committed crimes and not about the prevention of crimes and in addition, in only two of these 381 cases a link to terrorism was found, despite the repeated claims that terrorism is one reason for retaining telecommunications data. According to the German Federal Criminal Police Office, connection data is generally not missing for combating terrorism or organized crime but when tracking down the exchange of child pornography on the Internet or when investigating cases of fraud. However, for these offenses, the highest rate of resolution is achieved even without explicit data retention. Moreover, prevention is much more effective in the case of fraud than subsequent prosecution. For example, sensitizing Internet users can prevent them from becoming credulous victims of identity theft (e.g. through "Phishing Mails"). |
| - | + | The retention of telecommunications data is ineffective against terrorism and organized crime: | |
| - | + | * Serious criminals stay undetected by employing circumvention strategies (e.g. alternating use of unregistered prepaid SIM cards for mobile phones) or by switching to other communication channels (e.g. conventional mail, personal meetings). | |
| - | + | * The president of the European Confederation of Police, Heinz Kiefer, warned in 2005: "For criminals, it remains easy to prevent detection with relatively simple technical means, for example with the use and frequent exchange of prepaid mobile phone cards bought abroad. The result would be an enormous effort with little more effect than slightly displeasing criminals and terrorists." | |
| - | + | * Klaus Jansen, chairman of the confederation of German criminal police officers ("Bund Deutscher Kriminalbeamter") already complains today: "As word has spread that phone conversations can be wiretapped relatively easy, suspects now only rarely talk openly on the phone anymore." If a telecommunications data retention is put into effect, criminals will also adapt to it relatively quickly. | |
Auch sonst verhindert eine Vorratsdatenspeicherung keine Kriminalität. Irland, das 2002 eine dreijährige Vorratsdatenspeicherung eingeführt hat, hat keinen Rückgang der Kriminalität vermelden können. | Auch sonst verhindert eine Vorratsdatenspeicherung keine Kriminalität. Irland, das 2002 eine dreijährige Vorratsdatenspeicherung eingeführt hat, hat keinen Rückgang der Kriminalität vermelden können. | ||
Wirklich nützlich für die Arbeit der Sicherheitsbehörden wären andere Maßnahmen, etwa verbesserte Zugriffsmöglichkeiten auf ausländische Verbindungsdaten. Sicherheitsbehörden klagen, dass Auskünfte über Verbindungsdaten aus anderen EU-Staaten nur sehr langsam, aus Nicht-EU-Staaten überhaupt nicht zu erlangen sind. Dies beeinträchtige ihre Arbeit viel stärker als das Fehlen von Verbindungsdaten im Inland. Etwa 80% der Ermittlungen im Bereich Terrorismus und organisierte Kriminalität weisen internationale Bezüge auf. | Wirklich nützlich für die Arbeit der Sicherheitsbehörden wären andere Maßnahmen, etwa verbesserte Zugriffsmöglichkeiten auf ausländische Verbindungsdaten. Sicherheitsbehörden klagen, dass Auskünfte über Verbindungsdaten aus anderen EU-Staaten nur sehr langsam, aus Nicht-EU-Staaten überhaupt nicht zu erlangen sind. Dies beeinträchtige ihre Arbeit viel stärker als das Fehlen von Verbindungsdaten im Inland. Etwa 80% der Ermittlungen im Bereich Terrorismus und organisierte Kriminalität weisen internationale Bezüge auf. | ||
Version vom 00:58, 27. Sep. 2008
Arguments of Data Retention advocates critically discussed:
Telecommunications connection data is indispensable in the fight against terrorism and organized crime
Wrong. Even without exhaustive logs on every use of phones, cell phones, e-mail, and the Internet, sufficient connection data is available for fighting crime:
- Certain connection data is stored for billing purposes in any case - up to six months in Germany.
- In addition, security agencies can obtain a court warrant on demand, stipulating the recording of a suspect's connection data.
- The terrorist bombings of Madrid in 2004 were resolved by utilizing connection data which was available in any case. An explicit data retention was not needed.
- Until the decision to introduce data retention based on a EU Directive in the year 2006, only very few countries worldwide were specifically retaining telecommunications data. In no country were the retention practices as comprehensive as stipulated in the Directive. The wordwide security agencies have so far always been able to go without exhaustive logs of telecommunications data.
In a study, the German Federal Criminal Police Office mentions 381 cases where law-enforcement agencies were missing telecommunications connection data – compared against the more than 6 Million criminal offenses conducted every year this represents a marginal 0.01 percent. Furthermore, these cases were about the resolution of already committed crimes and not about the prevention of crimes and in addition, in only two of these 381 cases a link to terrorism was found, despite the repeated claims that terrorism is one reason for retaining telecommunications data. According to the German Federal Criminal Police Office, connection data is generally not missing for combating terrorism or organized crime but when tracking down the exchange of child pornography on the Internet or when investigating cases of fraud. However, for these offenses, the highest rate of resolution is achieved even without explicit data retention. Moreover, prevention is much more effective in the case of fraud than subsequent prosecution. For example, sensitizing Internet users can prevent them from becoming credulous victims of identity theft (e.g. through "Phishing Mails").
The retention of telecommunications data is ineffective against terrorism and organized crime:
- Serious criminals stay undetected by employing circumvention strategies (e.g. alternating use of unregistered prepaid SIM cards for mobile phones) or by switching to other communication channels (e.g. conventional mail, personal meetings).
- The president of the European Confederation of Police, Heinz Kiefer, warned in 2005: "For criminals, it remains easy to prevent detection with relatively simple technical means, for example with the use and frequent exchange of prepaid mobile phone cards bought abroad. The result would be an enormous effort with little more effect than slightly displeasing criminals and terrorists."
- Klaus Jansen, chairman of the confederation of German criminal police officers ("Bund Deutscher Kriminalbeamter") already complains today: "As word has spread that phone conversations can be wiretapped relatively easy, suspects now only rarely talk openly on the phone anymore." If a telecommunications data retention is put into effect, criminals will also adapt to it relatively quickly.
Auch sonst verhindert eine Vorratsdatenspeicherung keine Kriminalität. Irland, das 2002 eine dreijährige Vorratsdatenspeicherung eingeführt hat, hat keinen Rückgang der Kriminalität vermelden können.
Wirklich nützlich für die Arbeit der Sicherheitsbehörden wären andere Maßnahmen, etwa verbesserte Zugriffsmöglichkeiten auf ausländische Verbindungsdaten. Sicherheitsbehörden klagen, dass Auskünfte über Verbindungsdaten aus anderen EU-Staaten nur sehr langsam, aus Nicht-EU-Staaten überhaupt nicht zu erlangen sind. Dies beeinträchtige ihre Arbeit viel stärker als das Fehlen von Verbindungsdaten im Inland. Etwa 80% der Ermittlungen im Bereich Terrorismus und organisierte Kriminalität weisen internationale Bezüge auf.
